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Abstract
The Schematic Protection Model (SPM) is specified in the Symbolic Analysis
Laboratory (SAL), and theorems about Take-Grant and New Technology File System
schemes are proven. Arbitrary systems can be specified in SPM and analyzed. This
is the first known automated analysis of SPM specifications in a theorem prover.
The SPM specification was created in such a way that new specifications share the
underlying framework and are configurable within the specifications file alone. This
allows new specifications to be created with ease as demonstrated by the four unique
models included within this document. This also allows future users to more easily
specify models without recreating the framework. The built-in modules of SAL
provide the needed support to make the model flexible and entities asynchronous.
This flexibility allows for the number of entities to be dynamic and to meet the
needs of different specifications. The models analyzed in this research demonstrate
the validity of the specification and its application to real-world systems.
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An Application of
Automated Theorem Provers
To Computer System Security:
The Schematic Protection Model
I. Introduction
1.1 Background
The world of cyber technology is advancing quickly. Complex networks have
been and are being created linking individual computers into distributed information
systems. While this advancement in technology has had positive effects, usability and
access to information have driven the designs of systems while security to protect the
information they contain has lagged behind. While niches such as cryptography and
hash functions have seen advances, the overall security of computers and networks
themselves have not. Contemporary security models include the Access Control
Matrix, Take-Grant Model, and Schematic Protection Model. These models were
created more than 20 years ago and, aside from some useful extensions, have largely
remained unchanged since their creation. Even so, they remain relevant to today’s
security challenges, and in particular the Schematic Protection Model can be usefully
employed to study current security systems.
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The models remain applicable to today’s security needs; however, they are not
automated. To overcome this shortcoming, incorporating these models into auto-
mated tools is highly desirable. The usefulness of the models increases with auto-
mated computation. The development of automated analysis of specifications refines
and advances theoretical models underlying the security of information systems.
1.2 Research Objectives
The goal of this research is to develop a formal specification of the Schematic
Protection Model using an automated theorem prover and model checker. To validate
the model and to demonstrate it behaves properly it is applied to several realistic
examples.
1.3 Documentation Overview
1.3.1 Introduction. This chapter introduces the research and explains its
application in advancing the theoretical models underlying computer security. It
describes the need for advancement in theory and proposes a more formal treatment
as a solution. It states the objectives to be reached and outlines an overview of the
document.
1.3.2 Logic, Models, and Provers. Chapter II begins with an explanation
of computer safety. Propositional, predicate, and modal logics are briefly reviewed
as well as their application to underlying theory. Next, the Access Control Matrix,
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Take-Grant Model, and the Schematic Protection Model are thoroughly explained,
and an analysis of their application is discussed. The Schematic Protection Model
is selected for further analysis. The use of automated theorem provers in other
research areas is reviewed and a brief introduction to the selected Symbolic Analysis
Laboratory is conducted.
1.3.3 Specification of the Schematic Protection Model. Chapter III intro-
duces the Symbolic Analysis Laboratory, the tools that are included in the software
suite, and their use. The specification of the Schematic Protection Model follows. In
this chapter the segments of the model specification are described in depth as well as
the implementation of the Schematic Protection Model. The chapter concludes by
presenting the validation of the implementation using a Take-Grant Model modeled
via the Schematic Protection Model.
1.3.4 Model Application. Chapter IV applies the specification to the New
Technology Files System (NTFS) access controls. NTFS uses a white list for file
access and its structure and group permissions are analyzed via Schematic Protec-
tion Model specifications. The NTFS hierarchical protection model allows users to
access the contents of a folder with correct permissions in place. The group permis-
sions model demonstrates how membership in a group allows access to a file while
excluding non-members. Finally, a combined model exibits both of these properties
of NTFS.
3
1.3.5 Conclusion. Chapter V contains the research conclusions, applica-
tion, and suggestions for future research.
1.3.6 Appendix. The appendix includes contact information to request
verbose output from the automated theorem prover.
4
II. Logic, Models, and Automated Theorem Provers
2.1 Modeling of Security and Access Control Models
The ability to access information stored in computers has made it easy to
manipulate data. However, access to information can have negative effects if used
maliciously or if the information is sabotaged. The growth of computer networks and
shared resources has enhanced this effect. Data once safe due to physical barriers is
now accessible via computer networks. This dependence on computers necessitates
more attention to information security, and the basic building blocks of security
include three components: confidentiality, integrity, and availability [Bis03].
Confidentiality limits information or resources to those authorized access to
them. For example, military, government, or industry information is often marked
For Official Use Only. Confidentiality can even extend to the knowledge of exis-
tence of data. Because computer systems store this sensitive information, security
mechanisms must be in place to protect it.
Integrity controls have two aspects: data integrity and integrity of origin. Data
integrity guarantees that information has not been tampered with or changed by
unauthorized people. Integrity of origin, on the other hand, establishes the source
of the data. Integrity is important because while confidentiality prevents users from
accessing restricted information, data can still be changed inappropriately by an
5
authorized user and be corrupted. Likewise, corrupt information can be injected
into a system if the originator of data is wrongfully trusted.
Finally, availability must be considered. Simply unplugging a system and pre-
venting access would ensure the confidentiality of the information. Likewise it would
preserve the current state of the data including its sources. However, the data would
not be available. Similarly, if authentication mechanisms require an excessive amount
of time to complete, use of the system would be restricted. The data used for daily
activity, while still technically accessible, would not be reasonably available. Thus,
attacks on availability that intentionally deny access to data or a service result in a
compromise of security.
2.1.1 Safety versus Security. While systems that control the flow of data
attain some measure of security, this control cannot be proved in a mathematically-
rigorous way. Third party applications, unique configurations, and exploits that
have repeatedly compromised “secure” systems demonstrate that proving system-
wide security is virtually impossible. Even many underlying control system modules
in computers are not provably secure [Bis03]. In fact, security measures today are
most often akin to patching a dam or treating the symptoms of an illness rather
than its cause. Problems are solved as they arise but the root cause of the problem
remains unaddressed. For this reason, security, as such, is not an attainable state.
What is practically attainable is an absence of perceived threats. With this in mind,
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the “safety” of systems rather than their security is specified using underlying models
that are provable.
Much like an engineer develops or uses fundamental theories prior to building
a bridge or circuit, security depends on the underlying proofs of safety. The safety of
a system is the theory of security with never-failing, accurate access controls. With
modest assumptions and simplified models the safety of a system can be rigorously
examined. That is, the safety of a system with respect to the protection of individual
rights is provable. A system is said to be safe if it does not leak a specific right, r, from
a safe starting state. This ensures that the system will never enter an unsafe state.
Even so, the implementation of a safe system can have vulnerabilities introduced via
the security mechanisms used [Bis03]. Because the absence of flaws is not provable,
only the safety of the system can be rigorously examined. This examination is based,
ultimately, on logic.
2.2 Basic Logic
Logic models of interest for proving computer safety are rooted in propositional
and predicate logic. These logic systems are briefly reviewed before presenting the
safety models that employ them. For a more in depth review of logic see [HR06].
2.2.1 Propositional Logic. Propositional logic contains operators, symbols,
and underlying axioms that, when evaluated, result in a conclusion of true or false.
Thus, a proposition is a declarative statement that can be determined to be true
7
or false. “The kitten is small,”“The barn is red,” and “My name is Bob” are all
examples of declarative statements that can be evaluated. On the other hand, non-
declarative statements such as “Make the bed” or “May you live a productive life”
cannot be evaluated and so are not propositions. Simple declarative statements can
be combined so conclusions can be reached. For example, given the conditional
“If the world is round and Columbus has a seaworthy ship, he can sail around it”
and given the statements “The world is round,” and “Columbus has a seaworthy
ship” are true, the conclusion “Columbus can sail around the world” can be validly
inferred.
While such a collection of declarative statements allow simple conclusions to
be drawn, a more concise unambiguous representation is desired to represent the
underlying logical operators employed. Some of these include ¬, ∧, ∨ and → repre-
senting negation, conjunction, disjunction, and implication, respectively. By using
these operators, complex statements can be expressed more concisely. Using symbols
to represent short atomic statements, these equations are compressed even further.
Natural deduction extracts similarities in the propositional equations [HR06]. A set
of equations combined and used in a proof form premises. These statements can be
thought of as the evidence. The equation or formula to be reached is the conclu-
sion. By applying proof techniques to the premises, underlying assumptions, and
the outcomes of previous conclusions, a proof may be obtained. The combination of
premises and conclusions as one expression is called a sequent. A sequent is valid
8
a b ¬ a a ∧ b a ∨ b a→ b
T T F T T T
T F F F T F
F T T F T T
F F T F F T
Figure 2.1: Truth Table
only when a proof has been found. These terms and the basic structure of a sequent
are discussed in more depth in Section 2.5.
Propositions can be represented and combined in truth tables like the one
shown in Figure 2.1. Each column combines simpler statements with operators like
the ones mentioned previously. The example truth table shows different operators for
each column and uses propositions represented by symbols a and b. These variables
represent simple declarative statements and are listed with their combined outcomes.
In later columns, operands combine a and b into other statements. These are read
as not a, a and b, a or b, and if a then b. While these declarative statements are
useful, more expressive statements cannot be represented in this simple logic. To
capture these higher order statements, predicate logic is used.
2.2.2 Predicate Logic. Predicate logic builds on propositional logic but is
more expressive. Consider the declarative sentence “Every mother has at least one
child.” Under propositional logic this declarative statement could be assigned an out-
come but it cannot be further divided. However, there are some useful aspects of this
statement that cannot be captured by propositional logic. Predicates are functions
that accept a finite number of arguments and return true or false. Mother(Jane),
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for example, could result in true if Mother() is defined “is a mother” and Jane is in
fact a mother. Likewise, Child(Bobby) would return true when Child() is defined
to be “is a child.” Predicates can take multiple arguments such as MotherOf(Jane,
Bobby) which is true if Jane is the mother of Bobby. Notice that order is significant
and is the reason that predicates must be carefully specified and defined.
While predicates divide a larger declarative statement, they do not capture
quantities. If a program was written to evaluate the statement above, it would be
costly and inefficient to list all the possible outcomes in a truth table similar to the
one in Figure 2.1. Predicate logic introduces variables instead. A variable takes the
place of any term in the universe. For example, Jane, Bobby, and all other terms in
the universe could be represented by the variable x.
Predicates and variables allow for a more concise and robust representation,
but they do not support specifying quantities. For this reason, predicate logic also
includes the quantifiers “For all” and “at least one.” Without this added feature, an
exhaustive list of instances would have to be created. Instead, the use of quantifiers
and variables allow concise statements like the original example. The symbols ∃ and
∀ stand for there exists and for all respectively. The statement “For all x, there exists
a y such that MotherOf(y,x),” extends the previous example by using quantifiers.
This statement can be written as “∀ x ∃ y (MotherOf(y,x)).”
Predicate logic also includes functions that return an object. For example, a
function such as FamousAgent() when passed MI6 might return the object James
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Bond. Similar to predicates, functions must be well defined. Predicate logic allows
the analysis of the state of a system at a given point in time. However, it does not
include temporal statements needed to describe the operation of a computer system.
2.2.3 Modal Logic. Modal Logic can represent more complex assertions. A
statement is not evaluated to be simply true or false, but can have varying degrees
of truth [HR06]. When an outcome is always true it is said to be necessarily true. A
truth known to be true by the knowledge of a particular entity x is said to be known
to be true by agent x or believed to be true. Finally, a truth that will be true is
true in the future. “The square root of 25 is 5” is a necessary truth because it is not
temporal or dependent on what a specific entity knows. “It is raining outside” could
be true based on the perception of a specific entity. Finally, “there is no cure for
the common cold” is currently true but may not be in the future. While necessarily
true is a desirable statement because it is “strongest,” the other two truths are very
useful when considering computer safety. Defining theorems that specify conditions
for truth will be of great importance in this reasearch.
2.3 Existing Models
Operating systems have long incorporated mechanisms to authenticate users to
ensure confidentiality, integrity, and to a more limited extent availability of services
and data. The use of passwords, smart cards, and biometrics such as fingerprint
or retina scans are just a few examples of mechanisms implemented within com-
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puters. Some systems even put a priority on security before functionality. While
implementation of these mechanisms is challenging and difficult, simplified and the-
oretical representations are available. Separating the implementation of mechanism
and policy simplifies system modeling. Several fundamental models are worthy of
closer examination.
2.3.1 Access Control Matrix. The Access Control Matrix is a model gen-
eral enough to capture the protection state of any system [Bis03]. The model is
represented as a matrix that includes every object and subject in the system. Sub-
jects are actors in the system while objects are acted upon. Because subjects can
also be acted upon, they are objects as well. Subjects are contained in the rows of
the matrix and have certain rights over the system objects. Since subjects are also
objects, subjects as well as proper objects have columns in the matrix. The matrix in
Figure 2.2 has two subjects s 1 and s 2. Objects are listed across in the columns and
include file 1, file 2, s 1, and s 2. Because each subject intersects with each object,
the model can capture all sets of rights a subject can have. Defined rights for this
example are r, w, o, x. These are contained in the intersections where the subject
has a given right or set of rights over the object. In Figure 2.2 the subject s 1 has
the r, w, and o rights over file 1. Subject s 1 also has rights over s 2 as shown by
the intersection in the matrix. If a subject has no rights over a particular object, it
simply has the null set of rights at the corresponding intersection.
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file 1 file 2 s 1 s 2
s 1 r,w,o w,r,x
s 2 x,r r,w,x,o r
Figure 2.2: Simple Access Control Matrix
Rights must be clearly defined but can represent any form of access. Common
rights include read, write, execute, append and own. These rights are further defined
into more specific terms to govern the particular interaction. The Access Control
Matrix also makes use of primitive commands including create, destroy, enter, and
delete to manipulate the matrix. The create command adds a new subject or object
assuming they do not already exist. The create command adds a new column and/or
row to the matrix. The Destroy Command removes an object or subject from the
system. All rights to the destroyed object are removed. Enter and delete on the other
hand, grant or remove rights. Enter adds rights to the intersection of a specified
subject and object, and delete removes rights.
An important aspect of the Access Control Matrix is the principle of Atten-
uation of Privilege. A subject cannot grant rights it does not possess. This limits
the rights that can be transferred within the system. However, there are customary
exceptions. The own right can be defined such that a subject has the ability to grant
any rights over an owned object. For instance, suppose a user creates a file on a
computer. Since they created it (i.e., own it), they have all rights associated with
it. Because an owner, as defined can grant itself any right to an owned object, any
right to the object can also be given by the owner to another subject.
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While the ACM is robust in that it captures all states and all possible transi-
tions, it is also very impractical to implement as it grows large quickly. Furthermore,
due to its generality, a predicate function cannot be created to determine if a right
can be leaked. This more simply states means it is not decidable. For this reason,
the ACM is not a suitable representation to determine the safety of the system.
2.3.2 Take-Grant Model. The Take-Grant Model is a simpler model de-
signed with decidability as one of its major tenets. As such, it can be determined if
a subject can obtain a specific right over an object. While an Access Control Matrix
has operations to add and remove both rights and objects, the Take-Grant Model
does not include a destroy command to remove a subject or object. The absence
of destroy is needed for the decidability of the model. With its inclusion, the sys-
tem safety is not provable because rights could have been leaked and the evidence
removed before analysis. For more detailed information on this model see [Sny81]
and [LS77].
In the Take-Grant Model, each node is represented as a vertex in a finite di-
rected graph with edges that indicate the rights a node holds over another node.
These rights can include typical rights such as read, write, execute, and append.
However there are two “distinguished” rights called take and grant (explained be-
low). Like the access control model, other rights can be defined to represent other
capabilities of the system. These rights are also denoted on the graph using labels on
directed edges. Nodes, represented as vertices, are either solid or unfilled to denote
14
a subject or an object, respectively. A node with an “x” through it denotes a node
that is either a subject or an object.
The rights take and grant are “distinguished” rights because they are the
means by which rights are transferred between nodes. The node with a take right
over another node can acquire any rights the node possesses. Similarly, the grant
right allows a node to give rights it possesses to any node it has a grant right over.
The transfer of rights through the system is limited by these distinguished rights
thereby making the transfer of rights in the system decidable.
The operations within the Take-Grant model include take, grant, create, and
remove. These change the graph by adding edges, adding vertices, or removing edges.
Take and Grant add edges by sharing rights that entities have. Create adds a new
entity to the graph with incoming edges from the creating node. The rights over the
newly specified entity are found in the rule itself. A create rule is written “x creates
(α to new vertex) y.” This statement creates a new entity y and gives x α rights
over it where α is a subset of the rights in the system. Similarly, remove removes an
edge entirely or a subset of the rights it represents. It is written “x removes (α to)
y.” This statement removes the rights α from the set β of rights x has over y where
α is a subset of β. If α = β, the edge is removed from the graph.
Because objects do not act with respect to the protection of a system, they
can possess a right but cannot use it. Subjects connected by take and grant rights
are called islands as seen in Figure 2.3. The two islands are represented by the
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Figure 2.3: Example Islands
Figure 2.4: Example of a Terminal Span
shaded ellipses. Rights can flow freely among the nodes in an island by exercising
the take and grant rights or by other operations such as create. The object between
the islands can “hold” a right that can be later taken by a subject from the other
island. In this way, the islands are bridged by a span.
There are two types of spans in the Take-Grant model; terminal and initial.
A terminal span consists of a series of one or more take rights in the same direction
as seen in Figure 2.4. Take rights that are not all in the same direction as the
ones in Figure 2.5 are not terminal spans. Terminal spans allow a right to flow in
Figure 2.5: Example of a Non-Terminal Span
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Figure 2.6: Example of an Initial Span
Figure 2.7: Example of a Non-Initial Span
the reverse order of the directional edges over both subjects and objects through
successive take operations. Initial spans consist of a single grant preceded by zero or
more take rights all in the same direction such as seen in Figure 2.6. Once again, the
direction of the edges matter. Figure 2.7 is not an initial span. Initial spans are able
to transfer rights in the same direction as the edges over both subjects and objects
by a succession of take operations which transfer the grant to a node, followed by a
final grant operation.
By analyzing islands and two kinds of spans, it can be decided whether a right
can be obtained by a subject. Thus, system safety can be established. Predicates
determine whether a subject can share or steal rights in the system. These predicates
first determine whether the rights exist, and then rely on the presence of spans and
islands to determine the potential movements of the rights. Sharing occurs when a
subject grants a specified right to a subject or object. The predicate to determine
if such an act could occur is shown in Figure 2.8. The predicate itself returns either
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• ∃ edge α from x to y in G0
• ∃ edge α from a subject s to y in G0
• ∃ a subject s’ such that s’ = s ∨ s’ terminally spans to s
• ∃ Islands I1...In such that x’ ∈ I1 ∧ s’ ∈ In ∧ a bridge is between Ij and Ij+1
• ∃ a subject x’ such that x’ = x ∨ x’ initially spans to x
Figure 2.8: Take-Grant canShare(α, x, y, G0) predicate
• ¬∃ edge α from x to y in G0
• ∃ subject x’ such that x’ = x or x’ initially spans to x
• ∃ subject s with α over y in G0 ∧ canShare(t, x, s, G0)
Figure 2.9: Take-Grant canSteal(α, x, y, G0) predicate
true or false and takes as parameters the right α, x a subject or object, y a subject
or object, and the current state of the graph G0. The function returns true if and
only if x can obtain α rights over y by evaluating the specified conditions.
Rights can also be “stolen” in Take-Grant, that is, obtained without an original
owner granting the right. This is also determined by the predicate in Figure 2.9.
Once again the parameters are the right in question α, entities x, and y, and the
current state of the graph G0. The function returns true if and only if x can obtain
α rights to y based on the specified conditions. While the take-grant model can
successfully model simple policies, it cannot model more robust implementations.
For this reason, it too is not suitable for analysis of complex systems.
2.4 Schematic Protection Model
The Access Control Matrix, while general, lacks the ability to decide the safety
of an arbitrary system. The Take-Grant Model analyzes safety only for simple poli-
cies. Therefore, the Schematic Protection Model was developed. It has many similar-
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ities with the preceeding models but can analyze the safety of more robust policies.
The followed summary is largely from [San88].
Like previous models the Schematic Protection Model has two entity types;
subjects and objects; however, it also has protection types. A protection type is set
when an entity is created, cannot be changed, and determines the way rights affect
an entity. For example, an entity Alice is of entity type subject and protection type
user. These types determine how an entity interacts with other entities and what
effect rights have on them as defined within the model specification. A function, τ(),
takes the entity name as a parameter and returns its protection type. For example
τ(Alice) returns user.
A right held over a particular entity is called a ticket and is denoted as X/r
where X is the target entity and r is a right from the set defined in the model
specification. The set of tickets an entity currently holds determines its domain and
is returned by the function dom(X). Rights are divided into two categories: those
which can affect the safety of the system such as the take right in the Take-Grant
Model and those which do not such as a read right. These are called control and
inert rights respectively. These sets do not overlap and constitute all rights specified
in the model. A “copy” flag, in part, determines whether rights can be shared. For
example the right r includes the ability to exercise the r right but not share it. The
right rc is the same right with a copy flag allowing the right to be shared assuming
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other required conditions hold. Finally, the right r:c refers to both the ability to
share and use the right.
Links connect entities within the Schematic Protection Model. Links are de-
termined by the existence of control rights in the domains of entities. A link exists
between nodes X and Y if and only if a conjunction or disjunction of one or more
of the following statements is true where right z is a control right.
• X/z ∃ dom(X)
• X/z ∃ dom(Y)
• Y/z ∃ dom(X)
• Y/z ∃ dom(Y)
• true
A link is denoted by a function linki(X, Y) where X and Y are formal parameters
representing entities and is evaluated as true or false. For this reason, any time the
domains of two entities support a link between themselves, one exists. The universal
link, if true, denotes that there is a link between all entities in the model. Links are
established between entities, while filters limit the flow of tickets in the Schematic
Protection Model. Filters are defined between the protection types of two entities,
and each is associated with a link. Filters specify the set of tickets that can pass over
a given link. Filters perform a Mandatory Access Control function on the transfer of
tickets. A filter may allow the transfer of all to no tickets. For example filter fi(user,
user) = {all inert rights} limits the transfer of rights between protection type users
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to only inert rights. This, then, excludes the transfer of any control rights from user
to user over a particular link.
Similar to the Take-Grant Model, the transfer of tickets in SPM is decidable.
For example if a ticket X/r:c can be copied from dom(Y) to dom(Z) all three of the
following conditions must be met
• X/rc ∃ dom(Y),
• linki(Y, Z), and
• τ(X)/r:c ∃ fi(τ(Y), τ(Z)).
The addition of the filter, made possible by the protection types, distinguishes the
Schematic Protection Model from the Take-Grant Model and increases the expressive
power of the model. The Take-Grant Model can be specified in SPM without filters;
however, it is filters that increase the specification power of the Schematic Protection
Model and ultimately can prevent the transfer of the entire set of tickets when a link
exists if desired. Similar to the previous models, Attenuation of Privilege also applies.
An entity cannot transfer tickets it does not possess. A ticket must come from an
entity’s domain and cannot be given arbitrarily.
Creation of entities is regulated by a set of rules within the specification of
the model. These rules determine what protection types can be created by other
protection types and specify what tickets are obtained upon creation. When creating
entities, tickets are specified for both the parent (the creator) and child node (the
created). Cyclic creates are not permitted in the graph of the Schematic Protection
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Model. That is, if entity of type A creates a type B and the entity type B creates an
entity C, The entity C is not allowed to create an entity of type A. The specification
of the create rules are in set form specifying the type of the parent first followed by
the type of the child. An example can create rule in a model looks like cc = {(user,
file),(user, program), (user, user)}. This specification allows an entity of protection
type user to create a file, program or another user. Newly created entities cannot
be more powerful than the parent entity.
The Schematic Protection Model does not allow the deletion of entities, but it
does capture the decidability of the transfer of tickets within the model. It also is
detailed enough to capture more realistic scenarios than the Take-Grant Model. For
these reasons, it is worthy of further investigation and is the focus of this effort.
2.5 Automated Theorem Provers
Automated Theorem Provers are tools that aid in the derivation of mathemat-
ical proofs. While finding proofs has been considered more of an art needing human
thought, automated tools have made great progress and have established themselves
as valuable adjusts to this process. This branch of artificial intelligence has the ob-
jective of determining if a goal follows from a set of axioms [IF01]. Provers apply
inference rules to a given scenario. Solvable systems can be thought of as a finite
state machine that, if specified correctly, has a solution. The challenge then lies
in specifying the problem. Using predicate logic, as discussed previously, theorem
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provers can find proofs to many theorems that are correctly specified and thus are a
powerful tool.
2.5.1 Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL). The Symbolic Analysis Labo-
ratory is a collection of tools for formal specification, verification, and model check-
ing [LdMS03]. The tools, based on the functional language Scheme, work as a middle
layer to an automated solver. The expressive specification language is similar to the
Prototype Verification System (PVS) [LdMS03]. SAL includes a powerful auto-
mated deduction capability suitable for large formalized proofs. Base types within
the specification language include booleans, integers, reals and user defined types.
Type-constructors in SAL include functions, arrays, tuples, and records. These spec-
ifications are used to specify the Schematic Protection Model. SAL is discussed in
great detail in Chapter 3.
2.6 Current Research
Automated Theorem Provers (ATP) have been used in many research areas.
Research has been conducted using ATP for Computer Algebra Systems (CAS)
[AGLM99]. CAS uses PVS as a module running in the background to provide more
accurate results with symbolic integration. Other research within the realm of com-
puter algebra systems combines Maple, a computer algebra system, and Isabelle, an
ATP, to solve problems that neither could solve independently [BCGH98]. Algebra
systems are designed for computation while automated theorem provers are designed
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for logical operations. By combining logical evaluation and computational power a
Mechanized Symbolic Computational Systems architecture is formed.
Software verification is a separate field in which ATP have been applied. The
verification and certification of software to meet its specifications is a vast field
with methods ranging from code analysis to full verification. However, the highest
certification levels use ATP and apply logical proofs. In particular, ATP are used in
the verification of aerospace software [DFS06].
ATPs have been applied to computer security as well. Attempts to protect
against side channel attacks including power analysis attacks have used ATP. The
analysis of preventative measures use ATP to prove certain resource properties of
low-level code with the aid of ATP [Sev07]. This approach was effective for programs
not using mutable data structures. Experiments with transformations of generated
verification conditions provable by first order ATP were successful. For example,
to prove the in-place list reversal algorithm’s memory consumption had particular
shape properties, these simple transformations were used. Scalability impacts the
analysis of larger programs. ATP are also applied to other aspects of computer safety.
In particular, the Simple Type Theory (STT) was recently modeled using the ATP
LEO-II to automate the analysis of access control logic [Ben09] and STT translations
of modal logic representing access controls. Access control logic was translated into
modal logic based on [GA08] and embedded within STT and submitted to the ATP
LEO-II. Truth objects and theorems were produced by the ATP.
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2.7 Summary
In this chapter the importance of computer security and underlying safety of
systems was examined. Propositional and predicate logic were reviewed and shown to
be useful to specify models of computer safety. The Access Control Matrix can model
any security model. Its limitations, notably the lack of decidability were identified.
The Take-Grant Model was introduced with decidability as a key factor. While it
achieves this task, the set of systems it can model is limited. Finally, the Schematic
Protection Model was introduced. SPM is decidable and can represent many more
systems. The use of ATP was examined. The Symbolic Analysis Laboratory was
discussed in some depth. Finally, current research using ATP was discussed.
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III. Symbolic Analysis Laboratory
3.1 Symbolic Analysis Laboratory
The Symbolic Analysis Laboratory (SAL) [LdMS03] is a collection of tools for
abstraction, program analysis, theorem proving, and model checking. A SAL specifi-
cation includes logic for describing transitions in stateful systems. This specification
is similar to other verification tools such as SMV, Murphi and Mocha using initial-
ization and transition commands [LdMS03]. SAL tools are scripts written in Scheme
that invoke the SAL API.
3.1.1 Tools Included. Each of the tools included provide a different utility
to the Symbolic Analysis Laboratory.
The SAL well-formedness checker (sal-wfc) is the type checker run before other
tools to detect errors in the specification. While it does not detect all errors, it finds
many and is an important step prior to running other tools.
SAL symbolic model checker (sal-smc) is a Binary Decision Diagram (BDD)
based model checker for finite systems. This model checker performs both for-
ward and backward searches and prioritized traversal. SAL deadlock checker (sal-
deadlock-checker) is an auxiliary tool similar to the well-formedness checker for de-
tecting deadlocks in finite state systems. SAL bounded model checker (sal-bmc) is
based on Boolean or propositional satisfiability (SAT) solving. In addition to bug
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detection and counter example generation, the bounded model checker supports k-
induction for verification. SAL infinite bounded model checker (sal-inf-bmc) is also
based on SAT solving but for infinite systems. It too supports k-induction for ver-
ification of systems. SAL automated test generator (sal-atg) is an auxiliary tool
that uses the model checking tools to automate the generation of input sequences
determined by trap variables.
3.1.2 Specification Language. The SAL language supports built-in types
for booleans, natural numbers, integers, and reals and includes user defined types.
Types are used in the creation of subtype, subrange, array, function, tuple, and
record types. The SAL language shares many of the expressions of the automated
theorem prover Prototype Verification System (PVS) like assignments, transitions,
and modules.
3.1.3 Transition Language. Specifications in SAL are stateful. Transition
statements change state and may cause variables to take on new values. There
are two types of transitions in SAL: the definition and the guarded command. A
specification for a definition may be written as
x′ = x+ 1. (3.1)
This specification states that the next value of x will be one more than the previ-
ous. Similarly, methods, state variables, booleans, arrays, and other types in SAL
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can be updated and transition to new values. Guarded commands include boolean
statements to determine if a transition should occur, for example
guard→ x′ = x+ 1 (3.2)
says that if the guard is true, the next value of x will be 1 more than the previous.
Multiple assignments may have only one guard.
3.1.4 Modules. Modules within SAL are self-contained specifications of
a system including variables, initialization, and transitions. These systems are an-
alyzed individually or collectively and are synchronous or asynchronous. Modules
include different types of variables including INPUT, LOCAL, GLOBAL, and OUT-
PUT variables which determine the outcome of the system. Input and global vari-
ables are observed variables as they are set externally to the module. Global, out-
put, and local variables are controlled variables and are updated by the module.
A module also includes three main sections when applicable: DEFINITION, INI-
TIALIZATION, and TRANSITION. In the definition section, constant variables are
defined within the specification. The initialization section assigns starting values to
controlled variables that change within the module. Finally, in the transition section
the system state is updated through transition statements previously discussed.
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3.2 SPM in SAL
The Schematic Protection Model (SPM) is flexible. Therefore, an SPM model
within SAL must also be flexible so new specifications can be easily written. For
this reason and for readability, the design of the research model has been broken into
different files to reconstruct the specification as desired. Most of the changes to a
SPM model occur in the specification file. The SPM model includes a global record
file which defines a shared variable that is used throughout the model. The SPM
entity file is the “driving force” within the model. This context includes transitions
each entity undergoes to reach a maximal state. A helper file contains functions to
simplify transitions. Finally, the controller and SPM file create the system. The
controller initializes the global record and the SPM file includes the System Module.
Within the SPM file, theorems are created for analysis by SAL tools.
3.2.1 SPM Types. The SPMspecs file contains type declarations for the
various parts of the model. This file starts at the lowest specification level building
the SPM structures within SAL. These structures are then used to specify the SPM
specification of interest into a SPM model.
This file contains the declaration of protections types included within the model
as shown in Figure 3.1; in this case, user, superUser and a default type trash. This
last type is not used by entities within the model but must be included for SAL.
Rights include x and the default type null both of which are SPM control rights.
29
SPMspecs: Context =
BEGIN
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Specifications of the SPM model
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ProtectionType : TYPE = {user, superUser, trash};
Right: TYPE = {x,null};
ControlRight : Type = {a:Right| a = x OR a = null};
...
Figure 3.1: Protection Types and Rights
...
%%max size of arrays including domains.
maxIndex : NATURAL = 5;
natIndex : Type = [0.. maxIndex];
%%Number of starting nodes in SPM specification
Num_Nodes : nznat = 2;
...
Figure 3.2: Index Creation and Number of Starting Nodes
They are defined by a subtype specification stating that a control right is a type of
right and is a subset of rights.
To bound the system, a “max index” is assigned to the specification as seen in
Figure 3.2. This index affects the model and thus small values are desirable to reduce
computation time. The max index is used to create a type that serves as an index
throughout the model. This index is used in the array of create rules, filters, tickets
within an entity’s domain and true links within the system. SPMspecs also declares
how many starting nodes the specification includes. Create rules are specified as
shown in Figure 3.3. A create rule is a tuple of two protection types; the first being
that of the creator and the second being the type created. SPM does not allow rules
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...
%%Can Create
Can_Create_Entry : Type = [ProtectionType, ProtectionType];
Can_Create_Entries : ARRAY natIndex OF Can_Create_Entry =
[[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (superUser, user)
ELSE (trash, trash) ENDIF ];
Size_CC : natIndex = 1;
Max_Active : NATURAL = Num_Nodes * (1+Size_CC);
Node_Index : Type = [1..Max_Active];
...
Figure 3.3: Create Rules
...
NodeProTypes: Array Node_Index of ProtectionType =
[[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN superUser
ELSIF i = 2 THEN user
ELSE trash ENDIF];
...
Figure 3.4: Starting Entities
to include cyclic creates. In this specification, there is one create rule: an entity of
protection type superUser can create an entity of type user. The following section
calculates the maximum number of entities in the system to create an index type
based on the number of starting nodes and the number of create rules. This number
serves as an upper bound for the system. In Figure 3.4 the expression specifies the
protection type of the starting entities. The first node is of type superUser and the
second is of type user. The number of specifications here must be consistent with
the number of nodes declared previously.
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...
CreateID: Type = {Creator, created};
%% Boolean is copy Flag
CreateRight: Type = [Right, BOOLEAN, CreateID];
NoCreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight =
[[i:natIndex] (null, FALSE, Creator)];
CreateRightsFirst: ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight = [[i: natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (x, TRUE, Creator)
ELSE (null, FALSE, Creator) ENDIF];
CreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight=
[[i: natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN CreateRightsFirst
ELSE NoCreateRights ENDIF];
size_Create_Rights: Array natIndex OF natIndex = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN 1
ELSE 0 ENDIF];
...
Figure 3.5: Create Rights
Figure 3.5 declares the rights that are placed in an entity’s domain once an
entity is created. Each create rule from Figure 3.3 has a list of rights to be given
to the creator and created entity. The tickets corresponding to these rights are
determined during the create process. The CreateRight type specifies which right
is granted, if the entity has the ability to copy it, and finally if the creator or the
created entity are granted the ticket. When the create rule from Figure 3.3 is used,
the creator receives a copyable version of x right over the newly created entity in
the form of a ticket. The rights must be placed into the correct array structure of
CreateRights and the size of each of those arrays recorded.
Tickets are an important aspect of SPM. The specification in Figure 3.6 shows
how a Ticket is represented in SAL. A ticket is a tuple type consisting of a node
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...
Ticket : Type = [Node_Index, Right, BOOLEAN];
EmptyDomain: ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i : natIndex]
(1, null, FALSE)];
...
Figure 3.6: Ticket
...
%%Links
U_Link: BOOLEAN = TRUE;
...
Figure 3.7: Universal Link
index, the right over that entity, and a boolean copy flag. Also declared is an empty
domain for future use.
The universal link within the specification of Figure 3.7 is not dependent on
a ticket. If this boolean is true, all entities within the specification are connected
pairwise. In this specification a universal link exists between all entities.
Filters specified within the system are also a tuple type as seen in Figure 3.8.
They are the most complex structure within the specification and consist of many
pieces. Filters always determine what tickets can flow from left to right. The first
entity is X and the second is denoted Y. These are formal parameters meaning they
can be any entity within the specification. The first two values of a filter are the
protection types of both X and Y respectively. The next value determines the right
contained within the ticket that can be shared followed by a boolean determining
whether a copyable version of the ticket can pass. The remaining three values links
a Filter with a Link within the specification. Chapter 2 discussed the formal specifi-
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...
%%Filters
TicketEntity : Type = {X, Y, Conjunction};
%% Link(X,Y) = TicketEntity/right Exists dom(X), Exists dom(Y)
%% From Protection Right, To Protection Type,
%% The right sharing, copy flag can pass?,
%% TicketEntity of control ticket,
%% control right in X dom, control right in Y dom
Filter : Type = [ProtectionType, ProtectionType,
Right, BOOLEAN, TicketEntity,
ControlRight, ControlRight];
Filters : ARRAY natIndex OF Filter = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (superUser, user, x, TRUE, Y, null, null)
ELSIF i = 1 THEN (user, superUser, x, TRUE, Y, null, null)
ELSIF i = 2 THEN (user, user, x, TRUE, Y, x, null)
ELSE (trash, trash, null, FALSE, X, null, null) ENDIF ];
Size_Filters : natIndex = 3;
...
Figure 3.8: Filters
cation of control links. Examples of some of the possible control rights as presented
in [San88] are shown below.
link(X, Y ) ≡ Y/g ∃ dom(X) (3.3)
link(X, Y ) ≡ X/t ∃ dom(Y ) (3.4)
link(X, Y ) ≡ Y/s ∃ dom(X) ∧ X/r ∃ dom(Y ) (3.5)
link(X, Y ) ≡ X/b ∃ dom(X) (3.6)
link(X, Y ) ≡ Y/p ∃ dom(Y ) (3.7)
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These equations and the formal specification show that the presence of a link is
determined by the presence of tickets within the dom(X), dom(Y). Equations 3.3
and 3.4 model a Take-Grant scheme. Equations 3.5 - 3.7 specify a send and receive
model where entities must each contain control rights for a link to exist, and rights
such as a broadcast and pickup right where a ticket held by an entity over itself allows
a link to exist to all other entities or a link to exist from all other to the current
entity, respectively. To make the implementation of links and filters general, the
following scheme has been developed. The last three values of the filter associate it
to a specific link. These three values specify what domain must contain a ticket and
over which entity is the ticket held. The TicketEntity defined in the filter specifies,
similar to the above equations, what entity the ticket applies to. For example, in
( 3.3) TicketEntity would be Y while in (3.4) the TicketEntity would be X. Finally,
the third possibility is seen in (3.5) where a control right must be present in both
domains. In this case the value assigned is conjunction. The last two values of the
specified filter are the control rights needed contained by the dom(X) and dom(Y)
respectively.
This system includes 3 filters. All three links allow the passage of the copy
flag. The first two are declared for the universal link and the last is for the ticket
Y/x in the sharing entity’s domain.
The final section, found in Figure 3.9, declares what tickets, if any, are in the
respective domains. In this specification, the first domain contains one ticket over
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...
firstDomain : ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (2, x, TRUE)
ELSE (1, null, FALSE) ENDIF];
EntityDomains : ARRAY Node_Index OF ARRAY natIndex OF
Ticket=[[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN firstDomain
ELSE EmptyDomain ENDIF ];
DomainSizes : ARRAY Node_Index OF NATURAL = [[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN 1
ELSE 0 ENDIF ];
end
Figure 3.9: Domains
entity 2. All other domains are empty and have a domain size of 0. This concludes
the specification file for the current model.
3.2.2 System State. Within the specification of SPM, the current state of
the system must be set. This state includes the domains of the entities, and many
of the specifications made within the previously discussed file. For the state to be
updated easily and to allow entities to add tickets to other domains by sharing or
creating, state changes are made to the same variable. For this reason, the system
shares one global variable that contains the state of the specification. The SAL record
type in Figure 3.10 contains the state variables of the SPM entities and the system.
The dom is an array of domains - one for each entity within the specification. The
Size Dom is an array of the number of tickets in each of those domains. The ProType
array is the protection type of each of the entities again in an array. Max shared is
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globalrecord:context=
BEGIN
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Global Resource
%% This record holds the variables of all the SPM entities and
%% represents the state of the system.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
IMPORTING SPMspecs;
SysNodes: TYPE = [#
dom: ARRAY Node_Index OF ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket,
Size_Dom: ARRAY Node_Index OF natIndex,
ProType: ARRAY Node_Index OF ProtectionType,
Max_shared: ARRAY Node_Index OF BOOLEAN,
Num_Nodes: Node_Index #];
end
Figure 3.10: Global Record
a boolean array that determines if an entity has shared all of its tickets with other
entities. This is important as it changes not only when an entity shares but also when
a different entity shares a new ticket with the current entity. Finally, Num Nodes
contains the current number of the nodes created. This value tracks the last entity
created within the system.
3.2.3 SPM Entity Functions. This file contains functions called from an
entity to create entities and share tickets. These functions update the system and
navigate through the transition section of each entity as it approaches maximal
state. The functions found in Figure 3.11 update local variables within the entity.
The indexes iterate through arrays within the specification of finite indexes. These
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helper:context =
BEGIN
IMPORTING SPMspecs;
IMPORTING globalrecord;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
inc_Index ( i : natIndex):natIndex =
IF i < maxIndex THEN i + 1
ELSE i ENDIF;
inc_Num_Nodes (i : Node_Index):Node_Index =
IF i < Max_Active THEN i + 1
ELSE i ENDIF;
...
Figure 3.11: Increment Indexes
functions prevent “run away” values by checking the maximum value allowed before
increasing the current value.
The can share function in Figures 3.12, 3.13, and 3.14 provides much of the
logic within the transition section. Figure 3.12 checks for the copy flag and deter-
mines the presence of a universal link and the corresponding filter to allow a ticket
transfer. In Figure 3.13 the function searches for a control link established by a
right in either domain and a filter that allows a ticket to be shared. Finally, Fig-
ure 3.14 checks for a link requiring both entities to have a ticket. This function
returns a boolean determining whether the ticket can be shared in any of these
ways. Figure 3.15 is broken into its own function due to its transition outcome. It
determines the final case of the presence of a control link and filter.
Figure 3.16 shows a function that updates a specified domain by including
a shared ticket. It also increases the size of the domain and sets the max shared
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Can_Share?(X_index : Node_Index, Y_index : Node_Index,
sysNodes : SysNodes, ticket : Ticket) : BOOLEAN =
%% Copy Flag
IF ticket.3 AND
%% destination domain contains?
NOT EXISTS(i:natIndex):
(sysNodes.dom[Y_index][i].1 = ticket.1 AND
sysNodes.dom[Y_index][i].2 = ticket.2)
THEN
%% universal link
IF U_Link AND
EXISTS(index:{i: natIndex| i < Size_Filters}):
(Filters[index].1 = sysNodes.ProType[X_index] AND
Filters[index].2 = sysNodes.ProType[Y_index] AND
Filters[index].3 = ticket.2 AND
Filters[index].4 = ticket.3 AND
Filters[index].6 = null AND
Filters[index].7 = null)
THEN TRUE
...
Figure 3.12: Can Share Part 1
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ELSIF
EXISTS(dom_index:natIndex):
EXISTS(filter_index:{i:natIndex| i< Size_Filters}):
%% grant-like
((Filters[filter_index].1 = sysNodes.ProType[X_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].2 = sysNodes.ProType[Y_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].3 = ticket.2 AND
Filters[filter_index].4 = ticket.3 AND
Filters[filter_index].5 = Y AND
Filters[filter_index].6 = sysNodes.dom[X_index][dom_index].2 AND
Filters[filter_index].7 = null)
OR
%% take-like
(Filters[filter_index].1 = sysNodes.ProType[X_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].2 = sysNodes.ProType[Y_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].3 = ticket.2 AND
Filters[filter_index].4 = ticket.3 AND
Filters[filter_index].5 = X AND
Filters[filter_index].6 = null AND
Filters[filter_index].7 = sysNodes.dom[Y_index][dom_index].2)
OR
%% broadcast-like
(Filters[filter_index].1 = sysNodes.ProType[X_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].2 = sysNodes.ProType[Y_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].3 = ticket.2 AND
Filters[filter_index].4 = ticket.3 AND
Filters[filter_index].5 = X AND
Filters[filter_index].6 = null AND
Filters[filter_index].7 = sysNodes.dom[X_index][dom_index].2))
THEN TRUE
...
Figure 3.13: Can Share Part 2
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ELSIF
%% Conjunction
EXISTS(Xdom_index:natIndex):
EXISTS(Ydom_index:natIndex):
EXISTS(filter_index:{i:natIndex| i<Size_Filters}):
(Filters[filter_index].1 =
sysNodes.ProType[X_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].2 =
sysNodes.ProType[Y_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].3 = ticket.2 AND
Filters[filter_index].4 = ticket.3 AND
Filters[filter_index].5 = Conjunction AND
Filters[filter_index].6 =
sysNodes.dom[X_index][Xdom_index].2 AND
Filters[filter_index].7 =
sysNodes.dom[Y_index][Ydom_index].2)
THEN TRUE
ELSE FALSE ENDIF
ELSE FALSE ENDIF;
...
Figure 3.14: Can Share Part 3
Can_Share_Pickup?(X_index : Node_Index, Y_index : Node_Index,
sysNodes : SysNodes, ticket : Ticket) : BOOLEAN =
%% Pickup
EXISTS(dom_index:natIndex):
EXISTS(filter_index:{i:natIndex| i<Size_Filters}):
(Filters[filter_index].1 = sysNodes.ProType[X_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].2 = sysNodes.ProType[Y_index] AND
Filters[filter_index].3 = ticket.2 AND
Filters[filter_index].4 = ticket.3 AND
Filters[filter_index].5 = X AND
Filters[filter_index].6 =
sysNodes.dom[X_index][dom_index].2 AND
Filters[filter_index].7 = null);
...
Figure 3.15: Can Share pickup
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Update_Share( Y_index : Node_Index,
sysNodes : SysNodes, ticket : Ticket,
resetAll: BOOLEAN): SysNodes =
IF resetAll
THEN sysNodes
WITH .dom[Y_index][sysNodes.Size_Dom[Y_index]]:= ticket
WITH .Size_Dom[Y_index]:= inc_Index(sysNodes.Size_Dom[Y_index])
WITH .Max_shared := [[n: Node_Index] FALSE]
ELSE
sysNodes
WITH .dom[Y_index][sysNodes.Size_Dom[Y_index]] := ticket
WITH .Size_Dom[Y_index]:= inc_Index(sysNodes.Size_Dom[Y_index])
WITH .Max_shared[Y_index]:= FALSE
WITH .Max_shared[ticket.1]:= FALSE
ENDIF;
...
Figure 3.16: Update Domain (Sharing)
boolean to false for both the entity receiving the ticket and the entity specified within
the ticket as these entities now may be permitted to share more tickets. If a right
similar to a “pickup” right is shared, all entities no longer are max shared as specified
in the first case. Figure 3.17 contains the logic each node will undergo to share a
ticket during the sharing process. It is a simplification of the entity that will soon
be discussed.
The function in Figure 3.18 updates the domain of an entity when a new entity
is created. The can create function in Figure 3.19 determines if an entity can create
using a specific create rule. These functions are simplifications of the transitions
within the entity specification. By declaring them individual functions, the system
is simplified and duplicate code is avoided.
42
...
share_ticket(node_index:Node_Index, share_node_index:Node_Index,
sysNodes:SysNodes, share_dom_index: natIndex):SysNodes =
IF Can_Share?(node_index, share_node_index, sysNodes,
sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index])
THEN Update_Share(share_node_index,
sysNodes, sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index], FALSE)
ELSIF Can_Share?(node_index, share_node_index, sysNodes,
(sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index].1,
sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index].2, FALSE))
THEN Update_Share(share_node_index,
sysNodes, (sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index].1,
sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index].2,
FALSE), FALSE)
ELSIF Can_Share_Pickup?(node_index, share_node_index, sysNodes,
sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index])
THEN Update_Share(share_node_index,
sysNodes, sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index], TRUE)
ELSIF Can_Share_Pickup?(node_index, share_node_index, sysNodes,
(sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index].1,
sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index].2, FALSE))
THEN Update_Share(share_node_index,
sysNodes, (sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index].1,
sysNodes.dom[node_index][share_dom_index].2,
FALSE), TRUE)
ELSE sysNodes ENDIF;
Figure 3.17: Share Ticket
...
update_sys(sysNodes: SysNodes, created: Node_Index,
creator: Node_Index, right: Right): SysNodes =
sysNodes
WITH .dom[creator][sysNodes.Size_Dom[creator]] :=
(created, right, TRUE)
WITH .Size_Dom[creator] :=
inc_Index(sysNodes.Size_Dom[creator]);
...
Figure 3.18: Update System (Creating)
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can_create?(creator_Protype: ProtectionType,
Create_index: natIndex,
Can_Creates : ARRAY natIndex OF Can_Create_Entry,
size_Can_Create: natIndex):BOOLEAN =
IF size_Can_Create = 0
THEN FALSE
ELSE (creator_Protype = Can_Creates[Create_index].1)
ENDIF;
END
Figure 3.19: Can Create
3.2.4 Entity Specification and Maximal State. An entity in the Schematic
Protection Model is a reoccurring structure captured in SAL as a module. These
modules contain logic to drive the transitions of the system. SPM theorems show
that a maximal state exists for systems with acyclic creates. This state is reached
by exercising all create rules for each of the original entities. Next, entities share all
tickets that can be shared with current links and filters. This process continues until
entities have shared all of the sharable tickets with each other. Notice that once a
new ticket is received, an entity is no longer at a maximal state and must attempt to
share with all entities again. In this way, the system eventually reaches a maximal
state. These changes are driven by the Node module within the transition logic.
Figure 3.20 is the beginning of the entity specification. An entity can be in
several states specified in the type including sharing, creating, maximal, and inactive.
Each node takes two parameters to initialize - the node index to identify it and the
boolean original to determine if it is a starting node. The global variable containing
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SPM_entity:context =
begin
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Node Module
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
IMPORTING SPMspecs;
IMPORTING globalrecord;
IMPORTING helper;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Node_State : Type = {sharing, creating, maximal, inactive};
Node[node_index : Node_Index, original_node: BOOLEAN] : MODULE=
BEGIN
GLOBAL sysNodes: SysNodes
local original : BOOLEAN
local have_created : BOOLEAN
local entity_state: Node_State
local create_rule_index: natIndex
local create_right_index: natIndex
local created_index: Node_Index
local share_node_index: Node_Index
local share_dom_index: natIndex
INITIALIZATION
original = original_node;
have_created = FALSE;
entity_state = inactive;
create_rule_index = 0;
create_right_index = 0;
created_index = 1;
share_node_index = 1;
share_dom_index = 0;
...
Figure 3.20: Entity Variables and Initialization
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...
TRANSITION
[
%%No Create Rules
no_create_rules:
(original AND NOT (have_created) AND
Size_CC = 0 )
--> entity_state’ = creating;
have_created’ = TRUE
[]
...
Figure 3.21: No Create Rules Transition
the system state is sysNodes. The local variables determine what transition the
entity is in and are first declared and then initialized.
The transitions within the system are declared in the transitions section. Tran-
sitions determine what changes to the entity occur next; multiple are needed to han-
dle different states. Because only static recursion is supported within SAL, functions
that would recurse to a dynamic array size must be “unrolled” and included as dif-
ferent transitions. Figure 3.21 begins the Transition section for a system with no
create rules. This allows starting entities to transition immediately into the sharing
phase. Figure 3.22 contains one of the transitions for an entity. This transition
handles the last create rule specified and placement of the last create’s ticket. This
condition is determined before the arrow symbol. If the guard is true, then the
transition is made and definition statements to update the state of the entity and
global system follow. This is the case for each transition. The two transitions in
Figures 3.23 and 3.24 complete the specifications needed for the create process of the
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%% Last rule
%% Last Right
creating_if_final_rule_and_final_right:
(original AND NOT (have_created) AND
(create_rule_index = Size_CC-1) AND
create_right_index = (size_Create_Rights[create_rule_index]-1))
--> entity_state’ = creating;
sysNodes’ =
IF can_create?(sysNodes.ProType[node_index],
create_rule_index, Can_Create_Entries, Size_CC)
THEN update_create(sysNodes, created_index,
node_index,
CreateRights[create_rule_index][create_right_index])
WITH .ProType[inc_Index(sysNodes.Num_Nodes)] :=
Can_Create_Entries[create_rule_index].2
WITH .Max_shared[node_index] := FALSE
ELSE sysNodes ENDIF;
have_created’ = TRUE
[]
...
Figure 3.22: Last Create Transition
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%% ANY Rule
%% Not last right
Creating_if_final_create_rule:
(original AND NOT (have_created) AND
create_right_index < (size_Create_Rights[create_rule_index]-1))
--> entity_state’ = creating;
created_index’ =
IF (create_rule_index = 0 AND create_right_index = 0)
THEN inc_Index(sysNodes.Num_Nodes)
ELSE created_index ENDIF;
sysNodes’ =
IF (create_rule_index = 0 AND create_right_index = 0)
THEN IF can_create?(sysNodes.ProType[node_index],
create_rule_index, Can_Create_Entries, Size_CC)
THEN update_create(sysNodes,
inc_Index(sysNodes.Num_Nodes),
node_index,
CreateRights[create_rule_index][create_right_index])
WITH .Num_Nodes := inc_Index(sysNodes.Num_Nodes)
ELSE sysNodes ENDIF
ELSE IF can_create?(sysNodes.ProType[node_index],
create_rule_index, Can_Create_Entries, Size_CC)
THEN update_create(sysNodes, created_index,
node_index,
CreateRights[create_rule_index][create_right_index])
ELSE sysNodes ENDIF
ENDIF;
create_right_index’ = inc_Index(create_right_index);
[]
...
Figure 3.23: Create Transition Part 1
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...
%% Not Last Rule
%% Last Right
creating_else_case_right_reset:
(original AND not (have_created) AND
(create_rule_index < Size_CC-1) AND
create_right_index = (size_Create_Rights[create_rule_index]-1))
--> entity_state’ = creating;
sysNodes’ =
IF can_create?(sysNodes.ProType[node_index],
create_rule_index, Can_Create_Entries, Size_CC)
THEN update_create(sysNodes, created_index,
node_index,
CreateRights[create_rule_index][create_right_index])
ELSE sysNodes ENDIF;
create_rule_index’ = inc_Index(create_rule_index);
create_right_index’ = 0;
[]
...
Figure 3.24: Create Transition Part 2
entity. These transitions iterate through the create rules and placement of tickets to
ensure all possible create rules are used and that all tickets are granted following a
create. Ticket sharing occurs and the maximal state follows.
Similar to Figure 3.22, Figure 3.25 is the last transition for sharing tickets.
Also included is the transition “max shared” for an entity with no tickets in its
domain. Included within this transition and those that follow is the attempt to first
share a ticket with the copy flag and then without. While the copy flag is required to
share a ticket, the filter present for a link may not allow it to pass. Since this is the
sharing of the final ticket to the last active node, following this step, the entity has
shared all of its tickets and therefore, Max shared is update to TRUE. Figure 3.26
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%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Sharing of All Tickets
%% Node Max_shared is False and the node has created in all cases
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
sharing:
%% No Tickets in Domain
(NOT (sysNodes.Max_shared[node_index]) AND
IF original THEN (have_created) ELSE TRUE ENDIF AND
(sysNodes.Size_Dom[node_index] = 0))
--> entity_state’ = sharing;
sysNodes’ = sysNodes
WITH .Max_shared[node_index] := TRUE;
[]
sharing:
%%Last Node
%% Last Right
(NOT (sysNodes.Max_shared[node_index]) AND
IF original THEN (have_created) ELSE TRUE ENDIF AND
(share_node_index = sysNodes.Num_Nodes) AND
(share_dom_index = (sysNodes.Size_Dom[node_index]-1)))
--> entity_state’ = sharing;
sysNodes’ = share_ticket(node_index, share_node_index,
sysNodes, share_dom_index)
WITH .Max_shared[node_index] := TRUE;
share_node_index’ = 1;
share_dom_index’ = 0;
[]
...
Figure 3.25: Sharing Last Ticket
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sharing:
%% ANY Node
%% Not Last Right
(NOT (sysNodes.Max_shared[node_index]) AND
IF original THEN (have_created) ELSE TRUE ENDIF AND
(share_dom_index < (sysNodes.Size_Dom[node_index]-1)))
--> entity_state’ = sharing;
sysNodes’ = share_ticket(node_index, share_node_index,
sysNodes, share_dom_index);
share_dom_index’ = inc_Index(share_dom_index);
[]
...
Figure 3.26: Sharing Transition Any Node
sharing:
%% Not Last Node
%% Last Right
(NOT (sysNodes.Max_shared[node_index]) AND
IF original THEN (have_created) ELSE TRUE ENDIF AND
(share_node_index < sysNodes.Num_Nodes) AND
(share_dom_index = (sysNodes.Size_Dom[node_index]-1)))
--> entity_state’ = sharing;
sysNodes’ = share_ticket(node_index, share_node_index,
sysNodes, share_dom_index);
share_dom_index’ = 0;
share_node_index’ = inc_Num_Nodes(share_node_index);
[]
...
Figure 3.27: Sharing Transition Last Right
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...
[]
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
maximal_state:
(sysNodes.Max_shared[node_index] AND
IF original THEN (have_created) ELSE TRUE ENDIF)
--> entity_state’ = maximal
]
END;
end
Figure 3.28: Maximal State Transitions
and Figure 3.27 contain two transitions to handle all other cases while an entity
is sharing its tickets. Similar to the Creates, these transitions iterate through the
current entities domain and the other active entities within the system ensuring all
tickets are shared.
Finally, Figure 3.28 is the transition that is a “holding pattern” for an entity.
Because the addition of a new ticket into an entity’s domain means it is no longer in
the maximal state, this transition keeps the entity active as it waits for other entities
to reach maximal state.
3.2.5 Controller and System. To initialize the system and test current
specifications, the controller and system are created. The Controller simply initializes
the global variable using the values specified by the specification file. System, then, is
composed of one controller module to start the system and the maximum number of
entities the specification can reach as calculated in the specifications. The controller
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controller:context =
begin
IMPORTING SPMspecs;
IMPORTING globalrecord;
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Controller module will begin specification of system by
%% initializing the global variable.
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
Controller : module =
BEGIN
GLOBAL sysNodes: SysNodes
INITIALIZATION
sysNodes = (# dom:= EntityDomains,
Size_Dom := DomainSizes,
ProType := NodeProTypes,
Max_shared := [[n: Node_Index] FALSE],
Num_Nodes := Num_Nodes #);
END;
end
Figure 3.29: Controller
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SPM: Context =
BEGIN
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% System Module
%% Starts one instance of the Controller and Node_Index of the Node
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
IMPORTING SPMspecs;
IMPORTING globalrecord;
IMPORTING SPM_entity_exploded;
IMPORTING controller;
System: module =
Controller
[]
([] (node_index : Node_Index) : Node_2[node_index,
(node_index <= Num_Nodes)]);
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
th1: THEOREM System |- FORALL(i:Node_Index):G(original[i] =>
F(have_created[i]));
END
Figure 3.30: SPM System
in Figure 3.29 assigns the global system variable values from the specification file
and creates the model as specifed.
Figure 3.30 contains the SPM specification. The SPM file has the highest
context and is called to run the specification tools. The module contained, System,
starts an instance of the controller to initialize the system and as many nodes as
necessary. This file is also the location where theorems to be run on the specification
are placed.
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Figure 3.31: Take-Grant Starting State
Figure 3.32: Take-Grant Ending State
3.3 Validation
Different SPM models can be created and studied using the SAL files as the
specifications files can be adapted to analyze any SPM specification. SAL theorems
are then specified within the SPM file. Safety properties can be checked and the
strengths of a given protection scheme verified. To demonstrate the usability of the
SAL specification and validate the model, a Take-Grant model is specified. The
Take-Grant model is used due to its simplicity and widespread acceptance.
3.3.1 Take-Grant Model. The model selected is simple, having only two
nodes as seen in Figure 3.31. This graph represents the starting state of the Take-
Grant specification with only entity 1 having the x right over entity 2. Figure 3.32
is the expected outcome of the specification based on how the Take-Grant model
behaves and the presence of a create rule in the specification.
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SPMspecs: Context =
BEGIN
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Specifications of the SPM model
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ProtectionType : TYPE = {subject, object, trash};
Right: TYPE = {x,t,g,null};
ControlRight : Type = {a:Right| a = t OR a = g OR a = null};
...
Figure 3.33: Take-Grant Types
Figure 3.33 begins the specification of the Take-Grant Model. The model
includes the protection types of subject and object. Rights include x, a right repre-
senting inert rights to an object; t, the “take” control right and g, the “grant” control
right. The Take-Grant specification starts with two original nodes and contains a
create rule allowing subjects to create an object as seen in Figure 3.34
Figure 3.35 specifies the protection types of the three starting nodes. Node 1
is a subject, and node 2 is an object. Also in Figure 3.35 are the rights for the create
rule for the system. The creator in the case gets two tickets: one with the x right
and the other with the g right over the newly created entity both with the copy flag
set to true as Take-Grant does not differentiate between copyable and non-copyable
rights.
Next is the specification of links and filters within the Take-Grant Model.
Figure 3.36 contains these specifications. There are no default links in a Take-Grant
Model - only control links determined by presence of rights. Therefore, the universal
link is false. Filters in the system show the abilities of the control links. The t
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%%max size of arrays including domains.
maxIndex : NATURAL = 4;
natIndex : Type = [0.. maxIndex];
%%Number of starting nodes in SPM specification
Num_Nodes : nznat = 2;
%%Can Create
Can_Create_Entry : Type = [ProtectionType, ProtectionType];
Can_Create_Entries : ARRAY natIndex OF Can_Create_Entry =
[[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (subject, object)
ELSE (trash, trash) ENDIF ];
Size_CC : natIndex = 1;
Max_Active : NATURAL = 3;
Node_Index : Type = [1..Max_Active];
...
Figure 3.34: Take-Grant Starting Nodes and Create Rules
and g rights allow entities to “pull” and “push” rights respectively. Notice also the
limitations of the object protection type. It can not exercise “t” or “g” as it is not
an active type in the Take-Grant Model. The specification of the Take-Grant Model
concludes with Figure 3.37. Here the starting tickets in the domains are created.
The first entity of type subject has one ticket with the right x over the second entity
of type object and therefore a link “x” to it This creates the edge in the graph from
entity 1 to entity 2.
3.3.2 Theorems.
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NodeProTypes: Array Node_Index of ProtectionType =
[[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN subject
ELSIF i = 2 THEN object
ELSE trash ENDIF];
CreateID: Type = {Creator, created};
%% Boolean is copy Flag
CreateRight: Type = [Right, BOOLEAN, CreateID];
NoCreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight =
[[i:natIndex] (null, FALSE, Creator)];
CreateRightsFirst: ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight =
[[i: natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (t, TRUE, Creator)
ELSIF i = 1 THEN (g, TRUE, Creator)
ELSE (null, FALSE, Creator) ENDIF];
CreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF ARRAY natIndex OF
CreateRight = [[i: natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN CreateRightsFirst
ELSE NoCreateRights ENDIF];
size_Create_Rights: Array natIndex OF natIndex =
[[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN 2
ELSE 0 ENDIF];
...
Figure 3.35: Take-Grant Node Types and Create Rights
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%%Links
U_Link: BOOLEAN = FALSE;
%%Filters
TicketEntity : Type = {X, Y, Conjunction};
%% Link(X,Y) = TicketEntity/right Exists dom(X), Exists dom(Y)
%% From Protection Right, To Protection Type,
%% The right sharing, copy flag can pass?,
%% TicketEntity of control ticket,
%% control right in X dom, control right in Y dom
Filters : ARRAY natIndex OF Filter = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (subject, object, g, TRUE, Y, g, null)
ELSIF i = 1 THEN (subject, object, t, TRUE, Y, g, null)
ELSIF i = 2 THEN (subject, subject, g, TRUE, X, null, t)
ELSIF i = 3 THEN (object, subject, t, TRUE, X, null, t)
ELSIF i = 4 THEN (subject, object, x, TRUE, X, g, null)
ELSE (trash, trash, null, FALSE, null, push) ENDIF ];
Size_Filters : natIndex = 4;
...
Figure 3.36: Take-Grant Links and Filters
...
Ticket : Type = [Node_Index, Right, BOOLEAN];
EmptyDomain: ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i : natIndex]
(1, null, FALSE)];
firstDomain : ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (2, x, TRUE)
ELSE (1, null, FALSE) ENDIF];
EntityDomains : ARRAY Node_Index OF ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket =
[[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN firstDomain
ELSE EmptyDomain ENDIF ];
DomainSizes : ARRAY Node_Index OF NATURAL = [[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN 1
ELSE 0 ENDIF ];
end
Figure 3.37: Take-Grant Starting Domains
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3.3.2.1 Theorems in SAL. Theorems specified in SAL demonstrate
its power. Through the automated process, theorems are either found to be proved
or a counter example is found. The symbolic model checker (sal-smc) allows speci-
fication of properties using both linear temporal logic (LTL) and computation tree
logic (CTL). However, the current version of SAL does not support CTL counter
examples. For this reason, theorems are specified using LTL. LTL uses statements
such as:
• G(p) “always p,” stating that p is always true.
• F (p) “eventually p,” stating that p will eventually be true.
• U(p, q) “p until q” stating that p is true until q is true.
• x(p) “next p” stating in the next state p is true.
For example a statement G(p => F (q)) states that “If p then eventually q.” Because
the model is dealing with absolutes following arrival at a maximal state, theorems
will for the most part use the absolute statements. These statements are the basis
of the safety of a model.
3.3.2.2 Take-Grant Theorems. Theorems specified about the current
Take-Grant Model demonstrate its validity because the outcome is known. Verbose
output of the automated theorem prover is available (See Appendix A). Because
the Take-Grant model is graph based, visual representations of the starting and
maximal states are created. Figure 3.38 contains the starting state of the Take-
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Figure 3.38: Take-Grant Starting State
Figure 3.39: Take-Grant Ending State
Grant specification with only entity 1 having the x right over entity 2. Figure 3.39
is the expected outcome of the specification based on how the Take-Grant entities
behave. Entity 3 is created following the create rule specified and is of type object.
The rights given to entity 1, the creator, include both the t and g rights. The x right
over entity 2 held by entity 1 is then granted to entity 3. The following theorems
prove the specification has followed the correct procedures and arrived at the correct
outcome.
CreateBeforeShare: THEOREM System |-
G(original[i] AND entity_state[1]= maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
=> G(have_created[i]));
Figure 3.40: Take-Grant Theorem: Create Before Share
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Created: THEOREM System |-
G(entity_state[1]= maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
=> G(sysNodes.Num_Nodes = 3));
Figure 3.41: Take-Grant Theorem: Created
SharedXRight: THEOREM System |-
G(entity_state[1]= maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
=> G(EXISTS(i:natIndex):
sysNodes.dom[3][i] = (2,x,TRUE)));
Figure 3.42: Take-Grant Theorem: Shared x Right
The theorem in Figure 3.40 proves original entities have all transitioned through
the creation phase before all entities are in the maximal state. This ensures that the
system is following the transitions correctly, and that all original nodes have created.
Recall that the model started with 2 nodes, the first of type subject and the second
of type object. Also, the one create rule present allowed a subject to create a new
object node. For this reason, the next theorem in Figure 3.41 checks the number of
entities within the system to be 3. This theorem also ensures that the system has
created entities correctly.
The theorem in Figure 3.42 demonstrates that the model has shared the
(2,x,TRUE) ticket correctly. This theorem once again relies on all entities to be
in the maximal state and checks for the existence of the ticket within the third en-
tity’s domain. This proves that the system shared the right correctly. It also verifies
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Domain: THEOREM System |-
G(entity_state[1]= maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
=>
G(EXISTS(i:natIndex):
sysNodes.dom[3][i] = (2,x,TRUE) AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex):
sysNodes.dom[3][i] = (3,g,TRUE) AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[3] = 2 AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex):
sysNodes.dom[1][i] = (2,x,TRUE) AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex):
sysNodes.dom[1][i] = (3,g,TRUE) AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[1] = 2 AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[2] = 0));
Figure 3.43: Take-Grant Theorem: Domain
that the tickets assigned during the create procedure occurred correctly. Without
the tickets placed into the creators domain, namely the (3,g,TRUE) ticket, there
would not have been a link established to pass the (2,x,TRUE) ticket to the newly
created third entity.
Figure 3.43 contains the Domains theorem. It checks all the domains in the
system both for contents and size to ensure that the outcome of the system is as
expected. This ensures that both creating and sharing functions are working as they
should and that arbitrary tickets are not being added. This concludes the validation
of the Take-Grant specification.
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3.4 Summary
In summary, this chapter introduced the tools and specification of SAL. By
using the specification model, the creation of the SPM model into the SAL was com-
pleted and shown in detail. The use of the SPM specification has been demonstrated
and validated with a Take-Grant model specification. This chapter has demonstrated
the application and flexibility of the SAL model and the application of theorems to
the safety of computer systems.
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IV. Application Models of SPM
While demonstrating that SPM can model other protection models such as Take-
Grant is useful for validation, other protection schemes can be modeled as well. The
following section contains models in SPM that demonstrate its ability to handle
more complex systems such as operating systems with modern access controls. Once
specifications are made, theorems about the systems are created and run using sal-
smc. When run, this tool will either prove the theorem or provide counter examples.
4.1 File Systems
File systems such as the New Technology File System or NTFS have access
control rules determining which users have access to objects. These access controls
often are implemented using access control lists and specify what rights are owned by
users. Due to the hierarchical structure of file systems, access is not only determined
by a local list associated with the object but also by the directories the object resides
in. When permissions are set appropriately, users can access objects when they have
access to the parent directory. To demonstrate this aspect of access controls, a
model is created for analysis. NTFS also supports group assignment of rights. Users
belonging to a group can be granted access to files on a system. This model is
specified using a SPM model with different protection types.
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SPMspecs: Context =
BEGIN
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Specifications of the SPM model
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ProtectionType : TYPE = {user, file, folder, trash};
Right: TYPE = {x,null};
ControlRight : Type = {a:Right| a = x OR a = null};
Figure 4.1: Hierarchy File System: Types and Rights
4.1.1 Hierarchy. The hierarchical model grants users access to files based
on the location of the file. To demonstrate this access, Figure 4.1 specifies protection
types within the system: user, file and folder. To simulate access within the system
the right, x, is defined. Entities within the system are defined in Figure 4.2. The
first entity is a user, the second a folder and the third file. For simplicity, there are
no create rules in this model.
The links and filters of the system are shown in Figure 4.3. The universal
link is false. A filter for links determined by the x ticket allows this access ticket to
flow from the folder to the user. This demonstrates the settings of the file system
that extends the rights to a folder to the rights of the contained file. In Figure 4.4,
starting tickets are listed. In this system, only the ticket representing access to the
file is contained by the folder domain one granting access from the user to the folder.
For simplicity these are the only tickets located within the system. This concludes
the specification of the Hierarchy File System model.
The result of the model can be seen in the theorems presented in the SPM.sal
file. These theorems are proven in the current specification using the Symbolic Model
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%%max size of arrays including domains.
maxIndex : NATURAL = 2;
natIndex : Type = [0.. maxIndex];
%%Number of starting nodes in SPM specification
Num_Nodes : nznat = 3;
%%Can Create
Can_Create_Entry : Type = [ProtectionType, ProtectionType];
Can_Create_Entries : ARRAY natIndex OF Can_Create_Entry =
[[i:natIndex](trash, trash)];
Size_CC : natIndex = 0;
Max_Active : NATURAL = Num_Nodes * (1+Size_CC);
Node_Index : Type = [1..Max_Active];
NodeProTypes: Array Node_Index of ProtectionType =
[[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN user
ELSIF i = 2 THEN folder
ELSIF i = 3 THEN file
ELSE trash ENDIF];
CreateID: Type = {Creator, created};
%% Boolean is copy Flag
CreateRight: Type = [Right, BOOLEAN, CreateID];
NoCreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight =
[[i:natIndex] (null, FALSE, Creator)];
CreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF ARRAY natIndex OF
CreateRight = [[i: natIndex] NoCreateRights];
size_Create_Rights: Array natIndex OF natIndex =
[[i:natIndex] 0];
Figure 4.2: Hierarchy File System: Starting Entities
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%%Links
U_Link: BOOLEAN = FALSE;
%%Filters
TicketEntity : Type = {X, Y, Conjunction};
%% Link(X,Y) = TicketEntity/right Exists dom(X), Exists dom(Y)
%% From Protection Right, To Protection Type,
%% The right sharing, copy flag can pass?,
%% TicketEntity of control ticket,
%% control right in X dom, control right in Y dom
Filter : Type = [ProtectionType, ProtectionType,
Right, BOOLEAN, TicketEntity,
ControlRight, ControlRight];
Filters : ARRAY natIndex OF Filter = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (folder, user, x, TRUE, Y, x, null)
ELSE (trash, trash, null, FALSE, X, null, null) ENDIF ];
Size_Filters : natIndex = 1;
Figure 4.3: Hierarchy File System: Links and Filters
Ticket : Type = [Node_Index, Right, BOOLEAN];
EmptyDomain: ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i : natIndex]
(1, null, FALSE)];
firstDomain : ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (2, x, TRUE)
ELSE (2, null, FALSE) ENDIF];
secondDomain : ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (3, x, TRUE)
ELSE (2, null, FALSE) ENDIF];
EntityDomains : ARRAY Node_Index OF ARRAY natIndex
OF Ticket = [[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN firstDomain
ELSIF i = 2 THEN secondDomain
ELSE EmptyDomain ENDIF ];
DomainSizes : ARRAY Node_Index OF NATURAL = [[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN 1
ELSIF i = 2 THEN 1
ELSE 0 ENDIF ];
end
Figure 4.4: Hierarchy File System: Starting Domains
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%% All original entities create before they share tickets
CreateBeforeShare: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index):G(original[i] AND
(entity_state[i] = sharing)
=> G(have_created[i]));
Figure 4.5: Hierarchy File System Theorem: Create Before Share
%% Entities that are not original do not create
NonOriginalNoCreate: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index): G(NOT original[i]
=> NOT have_created[i]);
Figure 4.6: Hierarchy File System Theorem: Non-Original Do not Create
Checker. The Figure 4.5 theorem ensures the system has gone through the create
phase before sharing. This phase is only relevant to original nodes. This theorem has
been proven but is trivial in this case because there were no create rules. The theorem
as specified states that all original nodes in the sharing state have their created flag
set to true. This flag is set only when the entities are in the creating phase. This
theorem proves that entities must follow this path to completion. Figure 4.6 contains
a theorem that ensures non-original entities never create new entities. The process
to reach maximal state has only original nodes creating one entity per rule. This is
important to ensure that the system remains finite.
%% The User (entity 1) gains access to the File (entity 3)
UserAccess: THEOREM System |- G(entity_state[1] = maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
=> EXISTS(j:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[1][j] = (3,x,TRUE));
Figure 4.7: Hierarchy File System Theorem: User Access to File
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%% Checks all active domains to validate model behaived properly
Domains: THEOREM System |-
G(entity_state[1] = maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
=> FORALL(i: Node_Index):
EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[1][i] = (3,x,TRUE) AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[1][i] = (2,x,TRUE) AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[1] = 2 AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[2][i] = (3,x,TRUE) AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[2] = 1 AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[3] = 0);
Figure 4.8: Hierarchy File System Theorem: Domains
The theorem in Figure 4.7 shows that the User in the specified system gains
access to the file. This theorem is of interest because it shows the expected outcome
of the model which is to demonstrate the effects of the hierarchical structure of the
NTFS file system. In the start of the system, the user did not have access to the file.
Access was gained from the permissions over the folder. Finally, the last theorem
specified in Figure 4.8 ensures that the outcome domain is what is expected. This
ensures that no other tickets were shared or arbitrarily created. This theorem shows
that the (3,x,TRUE) ticket is in both the folder’s domain and the user’s domain
allowing the user access to the folder due to hierarchical file permissions. It also
checks the sizes of each domain in the model to ensure that there are no additional
tickets.
4.1.2 Groups. The Group permissions model represents users gaining ac-
cess because of their membership in a group. Groups are an important aspect of
computer security that prevent non-members access to particular files. Root and
70
SPMspecs: Context =
BEGIN
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Specifications of the SPM model
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ProtectionType : TYPE = {high, low, trash};
Right: TYPE = {h, null};
ControlRight : Type = {a:Right| a = h OR a = null};
Figure 4.9: File System Groups: Types and Rights
Administrator are generally the highest privilege users in a system. These higher
privilege users are granted more access to sensitive areas within the system. Privi-
leged users exist as a group and share with others these privileged roles. The group
model in SPM captures access granted by group membership. Figure 4.9 contains
the types used in the group model which include a high and low. These represent
different groups of users that limit the privilege of the user. Rights within the model
include the h right representing a high access such as write and append. This right
is also listed as a control right thus creating links due to its presence in an entity’s
domain. Figure 4.10 shows the starting entities and create rules of the system. The
model starts with three nodes with protection level of high, low, and high respec-
tively. For simplicity there are no create rights.
The next section in the specification file is the links and filters. Figure 4.11 has
no universal link. This means links are established entirely by control access. The
array of filters contain only one allowing a high entity to share with another high
entity the h right with the copy flag when a control link is present. Furthermore, this
control link is dependent on the sharing entity having the h right over the entity it
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%%max size of arrays including domains.
maxIndex : NATURAL = 2;
natIndex : Type = [0.. maxIndex];
%%Number of starting nodes in SPM specification
Num_Nodes : nznat = 3;
%%Can Create
Can_Create_Entry : Type = [ProtectionType, ProtectionType];
Can_Create_Entries : ARRAY natIndex OF Can_Create_Entry =
[[i:natIndex] (trash, trash)];
Size_CC : natIndex = 0;
Max_Active : NATURAL = Num_Nodes * (1+Size_CC);
Node_Index : Type = [1..Max_Active];
NodeProTypes: Array Node_Index of ProtectionType = [[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN high
ELSIF i = 2 THEN low
ELSIF i = 3 THEN high
ELSE trash ENDIF];
CreateID: Type = {Creator, created};
%% Boolean is copy Flag
CreateRight: Type = [Right, BOOLEAN, CreateID];
NoCreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight =
[[i:natIndex] (null, FALSE, Creator)];
CreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight =
[[i: natIndex] NoCreateRights ];
size_Create_Rights: Array natIndex OF natIndex = [[i:natIndex] 0];
Figure 4.10: File System Groups: Starting Entities
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%%Links
U_Link: BOOLEAN = FALSE;
%%Filters
TicketEntity : Type = {X, Y, Conjunction};
%% Link(X,Y) = TicketEntity/right Exists dom(X), Exists dom(Y)
%% From Protection Right, To Protection Type,
%% The right sharing, copy flag can pass?,
%% TicketEntity of control ticket,
%% control right in X dom, control right in Y dom
Filter : Type = [ProtectionType, ProtectionType,
Right, BOOLEAN, TicketEntity,
ControlRight, ControlRight];
Filters : ARRAY natIndex OF Filter = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (high, high, h, TRUE, Y, h, null)
ELSE (trash, trash, null, FALSE, X, null, null) ENDIF ];
Size_Filters : natIndex = 1;
Figure 4.11: File System Groups: Links and Filters
is sharing with designated by the last location of the h and Y in the specified filter.
The final section of the specification file is shown in Figure 4.12 and declares the
entities’ starting domains. The first entity has the h right over both the second and
third entities with the copy flag set true. Under these conditions, these two right
should be permitted to flow to the third entity by means of the control link and the
presence of a suitable filter. While the control link to the second entity is present,
no filter allows the rights to flow to the low protection type.
The theorem in Figure 4.13 ensures the system has once again gone through
the create phase before sharing. Only original nodes can create as per the process to
reach maximal state. This theorem has been proven but is trivial in this case because
there were no create rules. It is still relevant though to ensure the specification
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Ticket : Type = [Node_Index, Right, BOOLEAN];
EmptyDomain: ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i : natIndex]
(1, null, FALSE)];
firstDomain : ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (2, h, TRUE)
ELSIF i = 1 THEN (3, h, TRUE)
ELSE (1, null, FALSE) ENDIF];
EntityDomains : ARRAY Node_Index OF ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket =
[[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN firstDomain
ELSE EmptyDomain ENDIF ];
DomainSizes : ARRAY Node_Index OF NATURAL = [[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN 2
ELSE 0 ENDIF ];
end
Figure 4.12: File System Groups: Starting Domains
%% All original entities create before they share tickets
CreateBeforeShare: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index):G(original[i] AND
(entity_state[i] = sharing)
=> G(have_created[i]));
Figure 4.13: File System Groups Theorem: Create Before Share
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%% Entities that are not original do not create
NonOriginalNoCreate: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index): G(NOT original[i]
=> NOT have_created[i]);
Figure 4.14: File System Groups Theorem: Non-Original Do not Create
%% No Low Entities get h rights
No_h_Low: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index):G(sysNodes.ProType[i]=low
=> FORALL(t:natIndex): NOT sysNodes.dom[i][t].2 = h);
Figure 4.15: File System Groups Theorem: Exclusion of low entities
behaves correctly. Figure 4.14 contains a theorem that ensures that entities that are
not original are not creating new entities. Non-original entities do not create new
entities within SPM but instead bypass this step and begin to share tickets.
The theorem in Figure 4.15 ensures that no entities with protection type low
contain a ticket with the h right proving that the group of entities high have not
leaked a ticket with this right to a non-member. Had a low member gained access,
it would be as if an ordinary user on a system had gained administrative or root
access. This type of attack is known as privilege escalation. This theorem proves
the underlying safety model of groups with respect to right h.
Figure 4.16 contains a theorem that verifies being of protection type high al-
lows the h right to flow. This theorem proves that the group in this specification
%% H right is shared between high entities (group)
hShareHigh: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index):G(sysNodes.ProType[i]=high AND
entity_state[i] = maximal
=> EXISTS(t:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[i][t] = (2,h,TRUE));
Figure 4.16: File System Groups Theorem: Sharing to high entities
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%% Checks all active domains to validate model behaved properly
Domains: THEOREM System |-
G(entity_state[1] = maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
=> EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[1][i] = (2,h,TRUE) AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[1][i] = (3,h,TRUE) AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[1] = 2 AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[2] = 0 AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[3][i] = (2,h,TRUE) AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[3] = 1);
Figure 4.17: File System Groups Theorem: Domains
shares the tickets containing the h right with one another. While the previous the-
orem in Figure 4.15 ensured non-members did not gain access, it did not address
that members were getting access. The theorem in Figure 4.16 verifies that group
members have access. The theorem in Figure 4.17 verifies that the system behaved
in the expected manner. It checks for the presence of the tickets that should be in
the domains and verifies that the domains are the correct size and no other tickets
are present. This theorem proves the proper group behavior of the file system.
4.1.3 NTFS. While these models demonstrate important aspects of their
own, a combined model is also created. This model represents the groups and hi-
erarchical file structure working together. It demonstrates how SPM can represent
complex systems such as NTFS.
The combined model protection types and rights can be seen in Figure 4.18.
There are types high, low, folder and file. Only one right x to denote access is present
as a control right. The starting entities are described in Figure 4.19. Four starting
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SPMspecs: Context =
BEGIN
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
%% Specifications of the SPM model
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
ProtectionType : TYPE = {high, low, folder, file, trash};
Right: TYPE = {x, null};
ControlRight : Type = {a:Right| a = x OR a = null};
Figure 4.18: NTFS: Types and Rights
entities are of type high, low, folder, and file respectively. There are no create rules
in the system for simplicity.
Contained in Figure 4.20 is the false universal link and the filters throughout
the system. Only one filter allows access to flow from the folder to the user of group
high. This link and filter combination requires that the user denoted as high contain
the ticket with right x over the folder. The link represents access to the folder and
the filter represents access controls being set so that access to the file can flow. The
starting domains of the NTFS model are displayed in Figure 4.21. Both the first
and second entities have access to the folder (the third entity). However, the second
entity represents the lower privileged user of protection type low. Finally, the folder
contains access to the file.
The theorem in Figure 4.22 shows that all original entities create before sharing,
and Figure 4.23 contains a theorem showing that non original entities never create.
The theorem in Figure 4.24 ensures that the access ticket to the file is never
gained by a user with protection type low. This is demonstrating the group access
control feature as seen in the previous scheme. This is despite the fact that the
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%%max size of arrays including domains.
maxIndex : NATURAL = 2;
natIndex : Type = [0.. maxIndex];
%%Number of starting nodes in SPM specification
Num_Nodes : nznat = 4;
%%Can Create
Can_Create_Entry : Type = [ProtectionType, ProtectionType];
Can_Create_Entries : ARRAY natIndex OF Can_Create_Entry =
[[i:natIndex] (trash, trash)];
Size_CC : natIndex = 0;
Max_Active : NATURAL = Num_Nodes * (1+Size_CC);
Node_Index : Type = [1..Max_Active];
NodeProTypes: Array Node_Index of ProtectionType = [[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN high
ELSIF i = 2 THEN low
ELSIF i = 3 THEN folder
ELSIF i = 4 THEN file
ELSE trash ENDIF];
CreateID: Type = {Creator, created};
%% Boolean is copy Flag
CreateRight: Type = [Right, BOOLEAN, CreateID];
NoCreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight =
[[i:natIndex] (null, FALSE, Creator)];
CreateRights: ARRAY natIndex OF ARRAY natIndex OF CreateRight =
[[i: natIndex] NoCreateRights ];
size_Create_Rights: Array natIndex OF natIndex = [[i:natIndex] 0];
Figure 4.19: NTFS: Starting Entities
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%%Links
U_Link: BOOLEAN = FALSE;
%%Filters
TicketEntity : Type = {X, Y, Conjunction};
%% Link(X,Y) = TicketEntity/right Exists dom(X), Exists dom(Y)
%% From Protection Right, To Protection Type,
%% The right sharing, copy flag can pass?,
%% TicketEntity of control ticket,
%% control right in X dom, control right in Y dom
Filter : Type = [ProtectionType, ProtectionType,
Right, BOOLEAN, TicketEntity,
ControlRight, ControlRight];
Filters : ARRAY natIndex OF Filter = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (folder, high, x, TRUE, X, null, x)
ELSE (trash, trash, null, FALSE, X, null, null) ENDIF ];
Size_Filters : natIndex = 2;
Figure 4.20: File System Groups: Links and Filters
low user had access to the folder containing the file. This allows the system to be
declared safe with respect to access to the file. The theorem in Figure 4.25 shows that
the first entity is granted access to the file. Figure 4.26 contains a similar theorem
that makes certain all users of the group high have gained access to the file. Finally,
Figure 4.27 contains a theorem that tests the entire system for accuracy to make
certain it behaved as expected. This model shows that the expressive power of SPM
is flexible enough to be applied to today’s security systems for verification. The
specification of SPM in SAL supports automated proving of theorems of interest.
Once the safety of a model has been proven, implementation can proceed using
secure coding practices to minimize vulnerabilities.
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Ticket : Type = [Node_Index, Right, BOOLEAN];
EmptyDomain: ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i : natIndex]
(1, null, FALSE)];
firstDomain : ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (3, x, TRUE)
ELSE (1, null, FALSE) ENDIF];
secondDomain : ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (3,x,TRUE)
ELSE (1, null, FALSE) ENDIF];
thirdDomain : ARRAY natIndex OF Ticket = [[i:natIndex]
IF i = 0 THEN (4, x, TRUE)
ELSE (1, null, FALSE) ENDIF];
EntityDomains : ARRAY Node_Index OF ARRAY
natIndex OF Ticket = [[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN firstDomain
ELSIF i = 2 THEN secondDomain
ELSIF i = 3 THEN thirdDomain
ELSE EmptyDomain ENDIF ];
DomainSizes : ARRAY Node_Index OF NATURAL =
[[i: Node_Index]
IF i = 1 THEN 1
ELSIF i = 2 THEN 1
ELSIF i = 3 THEN 1
ELSE 0 ENDIF ];
end
Figure 4.21: File System Groups: Starting Domains
%% All original entities create before they share tickets
CreateBeforeShare: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index):G(original[i] AND
(entity_state[i] = sharing)
=> G(have_created[i]));
Figure 4.22: NTFS Theorem: Create Before Share
%% Entities that are not original do not create
NonOriginalNoCreate: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index): G(NOT original[i]
=> NOT have_created[i]);
Figure 4.23: NTFS Theorem: Non Original do not Create
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%% No Low Entities get access to file
NoXLow: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index):G(sysNodes.ProType[i]=low
=> NOT EXISTS(t:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[i][t] = (4,x,TRUE));
Figure 4.24: NTFS Theorem: Low Entities do not Gain Access
%% The High Access User gains access to the File
UserAccess: THEOREM System |- G(entity_state[1] = maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
AND entity_state[4] = maximal
=> EXISTS(j:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[1][j] = (4,x,TRUE));
Figure 4.25: NTFS Theorem: Access is granted to Users
%% H right is shared between high entities (group)
HighAccess: THEOREM System |-
FORALL(i:Node_Index):G(sysNodes.ProType[i]=high
AND entity_state[1] = maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
AND entity_state[4] = maximal
=> EXISTS(t:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[i][t] = (4,x,TRUE));
Figure 4.26: File System Groups Theorem: Create Before Share
%% Checks all active domains to validate model behaved properly
Domains: THEOREM System |- G(entity_state[1] = maximal
AND entity_state[2] = maximal
AND entity_state[3] = maximal
=> EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[1][i] = (3,x,TRUE) AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[1][i] = (4,x,TRUE) AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[1] = 2 AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[2][i] = (3,x,TRUE) AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[2] = 1 AND
EXISTS(i:natIndex): sysNodes.dom[3][i] = (4,x,TRUE) AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[3] = 1 AND
sysNodes.Size_Dom[4] = 0);
END
Figure 4.27: File System Groups Theorem: Domains
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4.2 Summary
This chapter includes examples of applying the SPM models within SAL to
a real-world access control system. NTFS was chosen for its wide-spread use and
interesting structure. The file system was first analyzed in small models representing
features of hierarchy and groups. Next a larger example to demonstrate the combi-
nation of these two NTFS properties was analyzed. Theorems describing the safety
of all three systems are presented and discussed.
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V. Conclusions
5.1 Contribution
The Schematic Protection Model is specified in SAL and theorems about Take-
Grant and New Technology File System schemes are proven. Arbitrary systems can
be specified in SPM and analyzed. This is the first known automated analysis of SPM
specifications in a theorem prover. The SPM specification was created in such a way
that new specifications share the underlying framework and are configurable within
the specifications file alone. This allows new specifications to be created with ease as
demonstrated by the four unique models included within this document. This also
allows future users to more easily specify models without recreating the framework.
The built-in modules of SAL provided the needed support to make the model flexible
and entities asynchronous. This flexibility allows for the number of entities to be
dynamic and to meet the needs of different specifications. The models analyzed
in this research demonstrate the validity of the specification and its application to
real-world systems.
5.2 Limitations
The SAL framework is very useful when the system is small and manageable.
However, since it creates all possible system states, as indexes get larger and more
entities are included, the execution time grows exponentially. Furthermore, verbose
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output from the model as it is being created does not indicate if the model will finish.
This was the reason for smaller concise models in this research. The models herein
required the use of dynamic reordering of the BDD which is an option turned off by
default. Theoretically, larger models can be analyzed on a large enough computer
with more time. However, changes to the specifications of the model require it to
be rebuilt. Saving the BDD order in a data file greatly speeds the execution of a
specification with multiple theorems as the BDD order can be read back into the
tools of SAL.
Throughout the development of the model, the limited resources documenting
the specification language and use of tools included within SAL was a hindrance.
The available documents were helpful but at times vague with limited examples. To
make matters worse, there is a relatively small user base for SAL. This issue was
especially clear when questions arose concerning the specification language and forum
questions went unanswered. The limited support of the underlying tool is a concern
to the current specification as it affects future support. For example when a previous
version of the model was nearing completion, it was determined that while recursion
is supported by SAL and is included in its documentation, dynamic recursion is
not. That is, only recursion that can be statically “unrolled” is supported. For this
reason, the original three transitions of create, share, and maximal had to be divided
into many transitions to bypass this limitation of SAL. Unrolling each recursive call
84
into its base case and other portions effectively created dynamic recursion. However,
this has greatly increased the complexity of the current specification.
5.3 Future Research
The usefulness of this model for Schematic Protection Model specifications
warrants further research. This is only the foundation as models can now be made
more easily. Future research should focus on theorems and detailed analysis of
models to determine the extent of the abilities of the automated theorem proving
capabilities.
For ease of development, a program to act as a user interface to the model would
greatly increase the usability and ease the burden of creating new specifications.
Perhaps a first step would be a SPM specification checking script that could be run
to aid in catching simple errors before SAL tools are used. Such a tool would be
very valuable when making larger specifications with long run-times. One or both of
these developer tools would greatly increase the usability of the tools created here.
Finally, as SAL advances and limitations such as recursion are removed, recod-
ing the framework to use dynamic recursion would increase its readability. Much of
its elegance is lost by unrolling recursive functions.
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Appendix A. SAL Tool Output
For more information on this research including the model specifications and verbose
output creating from the building and proving of the models, please contact:
The Air Force Institute Of Technology
Dr. Rusty Baldwin
email: rusty.baldwin@afit.edu
phone: 937-255-6565 x4445
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